Send the link below via email or IMCopy
Present to your audienceStart remote presentation
- Invited audience members will follow you as you navigate and present
- People invited to a presentation do not need a Prezi account
- This link expires 10 minutes after you close the presentation
- A maximum of 30 users can follow your presentation
- Learn more about this feature in our knowledge base article
Dispositif, Apparatus, Dispositive
Transcript of Dispositif, Apparatus, Dispositive
Foucault on Apparatus (1977)
[An apparatus] is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions - in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements.
Secondly, what I am trying to identify in this apparatus is precisely the nature of the connection that can exist between these heterogeneous elements. Thus, a particular discourse can figure at one time as the program of an institution, and at another it can function as a means of justifying or masking a practice which itself remains silent, or as a secondary re-interpretation of this practice, opening out for it a new field of rationality. In short, between these elements, whether discursive or non-discursive, there is a sort of interplay of shifts of position and modifications of function which can also vary very widely.
Thirdly, I understand by the term 'apparatus' a sort of-shall we say formation which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need. The apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function. This may have been, for example, the assimilation of a floating population found to be burdensome for an essentially mercantilist economy: there was a strategic imperative acting here as the matrix for an apparatus which gradually undertook the control or subjection of madness, mental illness and neurosis” [Foucaut, 1980 (1977): 194-195]
The Foucault constellation
Prof. Ruggero Eugeni
Catholic University of Milan
Giorgio Agamben, 2009 (2006) “What is an Apparatus” in Id., What is an Apparatus and Other Essays, Stanford (Cal.), Stanford University Press, pp. 1-24 (Che cos’è un dispositivo?, Roma, Nottetempo, 2006)
François Albera, Maria Tortajada (eds.), 2010, Cinema Beyond Film : Media Epistemology in the Modern Era, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press.
Jean-Louis Baudry, 1986 (1970) “Ideological effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus”, in Film Quarterly, Winter 1974-1975, vol. 28, n. 2, pp. 39-47, then in Philip Rosen (ed.), Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology. A Film Theory Reader, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 286-298 (“Effect ideologiques de l’appareil cinematographique de base”, in Cinéthique, nn. 7-8, 1970, pp. 1-8, then in Id., L’effet cinéma, Paris, Albatros, 1978)
Jean-Louis Baudry, 1986 (1975) “The Apparatus: Metapsychological Approaches to the Impression of reality in the Cinema”, in Camera Obscura, n. 1, 1976, pp. 104-128, then in Philip Rosen (ed.), Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology. A Film Theory Reader, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 299-318 ( “Le dispositive: approaches métapsychologiques de l’impression de realité”, in Communications, n. 23, 1975, pp. 56-72, poi in Id., L’effet cinéma, Paris, Albatros, 1978)
Raymond Bellour, 2012, La querelle des dispositifs. Cinéma – installations, expositions, Paris, P.O.L. Traffic
Gilles Deleuze, 2006 (1989) “What is a Dispositif?”, in Id. Two regimes of madness. Texts and Interviews 1975-1995, Los Angeles (CA), Semiotext(e) – Cambridge (Mass.), MIT Press, pp. 338-348 («Qu’est-ce qu’un dispositif?», in Aa.Vv., Michel Foucault. Rencontre internationale, (Paris, 9, 10, 11 janvier 1988), Paris, Le Seuil, 1989, then in Id., Deux régimes de fous et autres textes (1975-1995), Paris, Minuit, 2003, pp. 316-325
Thomas Elsaesser, 2008, « Digital Cinema and the Apparatus: Archaeologies, Epistemologies, Ontologies », in Bruce Bennett, Marc Furstenau, Adrian MacKenzie (eds.), Cinema and Technology. Cultures, Theories, Practices, London, Palgrave, pp. 226 – 240.
Michel Foucault, 1980 (1977) “The Confession of the Flash”, in Id., Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon, New York, Pantheon Books, pp. 194-228 (« Le jeu de Michel Foucault », entretien avec Colas, D. Grosrichard, A. Le Gaufey, G. Livi, J. Miller, G. Miller, J. Miller J.-A. Millot, C. Wajeman, in Ornicar, Bulletin périodique du champ freudien, n° 10, juillet 1977, p. 62-93; then in Id., Dits et Ecrits II. 1976-1979, Paris, Gallimard, 1994, texte n° 206, pp. 299-329)
Sigmund Freud, 1953-1974 (1900) The Interpretation of dreams, in Id., The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works, ed. by James Strachey et al., London, The Hogart Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, voll. 4 -5, pp. 508 - 1456 (Traumdeutung, Leipzig - Wien, Franz Deuticke, 1900).
Martin Heidegger, 1977 (1954), “The Question Concerning Technology”, in Id. The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trad. e introd. di William Lovitt, Garland, New York – London, pp. 3-35 (“Die Frage nach der Technik”, in Id. Die Technik und die Kehre, Pfullingen, Gunther Neske, 1962 (1954-1955), pp. 5-37).
Frank Kessler, 2007, Notes on dispositif, mimeo, available on line http://www.let.uu.nl/~Frank.Kessler/personal/notes%20on%20dispositif.PDF
Jean Laplanche, Jean-Bertand Pontalis, 1973 (1967), “Psychic Apparatus”, in The Language of Psychoanalysis, London, The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis ( “Appareil psychique” in Vocabulaire de la Psycahanalyse, Paris, PUF, 1967).
Foucault's definition of Apparatus
Apparatus is essentially of a strategic nature, which means assuming that it is a matter of a certain manipulation of relations of forces, either developing them in a particular direction, blocking them, stabilising them, utilising them, etc. The apparatus is thus always inscribed in a play of power, but it is also always linked to certain coordinates of knowledge which issue from it but, to an equal degree, condition it. This is what the apparatus consists in: strategies of relations of forces supporting, and supported by, types of knowledge. […]
What I call an apparatus is a much more general case of the episteme; or rather, that the episteme is a specifically discursive apparatus, whereas the apparatus in its general form is both discursive and non-discursive, its elements being much more heterogeneous. [More precisely], the episteme is the 'apparatus' which makes possible the separation, not of the true from the false, but of what may from what may not be characterised as scientific.
[…] Power means relations, a more-or-less organized, hierarchical co-ordinated cluster of relations. […] If power is in reality an open, more-or-less coordinated (in the event, no doubt, ill-coordinated) cluster of relations, then the only problem is to provide oneself with a grid of analysis which makes possible an analytic of relations of power [Foucaut, 1980 (1977): 196-198].
Apparatus & Episteme
Following Foucault, apparatus ("dispositif") is:
A system of mobile and shifting relations that the analyst establishes between heterogeneous elements (both discursive and non discursive: difference from epistheme)
in order to identify a strategical process (i.e. a process of power, a "manipulation of relations of forces") and to allow an "analytic of relations of power"
with a focus on the ways in which types of knowledge / discourses supports and are supported by power strategies
To sum up...
Deleuze on Foucault (1989)
What is an apparatus? First of all, it is a skein, a multilinear whole. It is composed of lines of different natures. The lines in the apparatus do not encircle or surround systems that are each homogenous in themselves, the object, the subject, language, etc., but follow directions, trace processes that are always out of balance, thar sometimes move closer together and sometimes farther away. Each line is broken, subject to changes in directions, bifurcating and forked, and subjected to derivations
[Secondly], The first two dimensions of an apparatus […] are the curves of visibility and the curves of utterance. Because apparatuses are […] machines that make one see and talk. […] There are neither subjects nor objects but regimes that must be defined for the visible and the utterable with their derivations, transformations, mutations. ln each appararus, the lines cross thresholds that make them either aesthetic, scientific, political, etc.
Thirdly, an apparatus contains lines of force. One might say that they move from one single point ro another on the previous lines. […] It is the "dimension of power” and power is the third dimension of space, interior to the apparatus and variable with rhe apparatuses. Like power, it is composed with knowledge [Deleuze, 2006 (1989): 339-340].
Deleuze's reformulation of Foucault's Definition
[…] A line of subjectivation is a process, a production of subjectivity, in an apparatus: it must be made to the extent that the apparatus allows it or makes it possibile. […] The Self is not knowledge or power. It is a process of individuation that effects groupes or people and eludes both established lines of forces and constituted knowlde. It is a kind of surplus value. Not every apparatus necessarily has it .
Apparatuses are therefore composed of lines of visibility, utterance, lines of force, lines of subjectivation, lines of cracking, breaking and ruptures that all intertwine and mix together and where some augment the others or elicit others through varations and even mutations of the assemblage .
Self, subjectivity, apparatus
In his re-reading of Foucault's concept of "Apparatus", Deleuze:
Tends to transform the concept of apparatus from an epistemological tool to a ontological entity
Outlines its nature of "assemblage" and "ryzhome" (Deleuze or Deleuze & Guattari concepts)
"Shifts the focus from the idea that a dispositif establishes relations and connections between the heterogeneous elements that constitute it, to the disjoint and in fact rather precarious character of such a formation" (Kessler, 2007: 3)
To sum up...
Heidegger's Legacy (1955)
Modern Technology (based on hard sciences and physics) asks to conceive the world as an ordered entity, already disposed to exploitation:
"We now name that challenging claim which gathers man thither to order the self-revealing as standing-reserve “Ge-stellen" [Enframing]
Enframing means the gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve. Enframing means that way of revealing which holds sway in the essence of modern technology and which is itself nothing technological. On the other hand, all those things that are so familiar to us and are standard parts of an assembly, such as rods, pistons, and chassis, belong to the technological. The assembly itself, however, together with the aforementioned stockparts, falls within the sphere of technological activity; and this activity always merely responds to the challenge of Enframing, but it never comprises Enframing itself or brings it about." [Heidegger, 1977 (1962): 19-21]
The idea of "Ge-stellen" (Enframing)
Heidegger introduces a specific link between apparatus and technology: the very idea of apparatus implies a culture of technology and of "mechanization" of subject
To sum up...
Agamben on Apparatus (2003)
For Foucault, what is at stake [in the concept of "apparatus"] is the investigation of concrete modes in which the positivities (or the apparatuses) act within the relations, mechanisms, and "plays" of power (6).
[The concept is linked to the idea of "oikonomia" (dispositio) which, following a theological tradition, indicates the process of "acting - managing" a given reality as opposite to the "being" of subjetcs and objects involved in it; from this point of view Foucault's concept of apparatus is reunited to Heidegger's Gestellen]:
What is common to all these terms [apparatus, positivity, gestellen] is that they refer back to this oikonomia, that is, to a set of practices, bodies of knowledge, measures, and institutions that aim to manage, govern, control, and orient-in a way that purports to be useful-the behaviours, gestures, and thoughts of human beings [Agamben 2009 (2006): 6, 12]
The "dispositional" paradigm
In re-launching the debate, Agamben:
To sum up...
Further expanding the already large class of Foucaultian apparatuses, I shall call an apparatus literally anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions. or discourses of living beings. Not only, therefore, prisons, mad houses, the panopticon, schools, confession, factories, disciplines, juridical measures, and so forth (whose connection with power is in a certain sense evident), but also the pen, writing, literature, philosophy, agriculture, cigarettes, navigation, computers, cellular telephones and - why not- language itself, which is perhaps the most ancient of apparatuses. (Ivi: 14)
The extension of the concept
Takes a heideggerian framework: apparatuses are external to and separate from essence, and they tend to "manage" them
By this way he reintroduces the problem of technology as integral to the notion of apparatus
At the same time he re-ontologise the concept (apparatuses and essences are at the same level)
As a consequence, he doesn't distinguish between general cultural frameworks and particular experiential situations linked to specific devices
The Baudry constellation
Baudry on Apparatus (1975)
We distinguish the basic cinematographic apparatus [l'appareil de base], which concerns the ensemble of the equipment and operations necessary to the production of a film and its projection, from the apparatus [Ie dispositif] , which solely concerns projection and which includes the subject to whom the projection is addressed. Thus the basic cinematographic apparatus involves the film stock, the camera, developing, montage considered in its technical aspects, etc., as well as the apparatus [dispositif] of projection. [Baudry 1986 (1975): n. 2, p. 317]
[Cinema] constitutes the ‘subject’ by the illusory delimitation of a central location […] It is an apparatus [appareil] destined to obtain precise ideological effects, necessary to the dominant ideology: creating a phantasmatization of the subject, it collaborates with a marked efficacy in the maintenance of idealism Baudry 1986 (1970): 295].
Baudry's general definition of Appareil / Dispositif
[Both Plato's cave mith and cinema "apparatus" express the situation of a subject immersed in an allucination of "illusion / impression of reality". This similarity depends on the fact that] a same apparatus was responsible for the invention of the cinema and was already present in Plato [Baudry 1986 (1975): 307].
[This "fundamental" apparatus is the mental or psychic apparatus emerging in dreams, as focused by Freud. Therefore, cinema is a technological apparatus simulating the psychic one - and in particular the dynamic of regression of the subject towards a narcissistic indistinction of him/herself and the exterior reality and of perception and representation]: taking into account the darkness of the movie theatre, the relative passivity of the situation, the forced immobility of the cine-subject, and the effects which result from the projection of images, moving images, the cinematographic apparatus brings about a state of artificial regression. … Return toward a relative narcissism, and even more toward a mode of relating to reality which could be defined as enveloping and in which the separation between one’s own body and the exterior world is not well defined  It should also be noted in this connection that if the confusion between representation and perception is characteristic of the primary process which is governed by the pleasure principle, and which is the basic condition for the satisfaction produced by hallucination, the cinematographic apparatus appears to succeed in suspending the secondary process and anything having to do with the principle of reality without eliminating it completely. 
The Cinematic Apparatus
For Baudry, (cinematic) apparatus ("dispositif") is:
The specific physical situation (reciprocal positions of projector, seats and screen, consequently the position of the viewer, etc.) that determines the particular experience of film viewing
A technological manifestation of psychic apparatus (Freud) intended as the specific mental configuration operating the tranformation of desires in moving images perceived as more-than-real, through a narcissistic regression.
Apparatus has then in Baudry a twofold nature, being at the same time both a cultural and historical construction, and the manifestation of a trans historical entity.
To sum up...
The simulation apparatus therefore consists in transforming a perception into a quasi-hallucination endowed with a reality effect which cannot be compared to that which results from ordinary perception. The cinematographic apparatus reproduces the psychical apparatus during sleep: separation from the outside world, inhibition of motoricity; in sleep, these conditions causing an overcathexis of representation can penetrate the system of perception as sensory stimuli; in cinema, the images perceived (very likely reinforced by the setup ofthe psychical apparatus) will be overcathected and thus acquire a status which will be the same as that of the sensory images of dream (315-316).
Cinema as simulation apparatus
Psychical (or Psychic or Mental) Apparatus” (= D.: psychischer or seelischer Apparat. - Fr.: appareil psychique [is a] term which underscores certain characteristics attributed to the psyche by the Freudian theory: its capacity to transmit and transform a specific energy and its subdivision into systems or agencies.
The coexistence of the different systems which make up the psychical apparatus is not to be taken in an anatomical sense, as would be the case in a theory of cerebral localisation. This coexistence means simply that excitations must follow a progression determined by the position of the various systems
The word ‘apparatus’ evokes the idea of a task, or even that of work. [...] the function of the psychical apparatus is to keep the internal energy of an organism at the lowest possible level
[Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973 (1967), voice].
Plato's cave myth (390 - 360 a-C.)
We should picture the instrument which carries out our mental functions as resembling a compound microscope or a photographic apparatus, or something of the kind. On that basis, psychical locality will correspond to a point inside the apparatus at which one of the preliminary stages of an image comes into being. In the microscope and telescope, as we know, these occur in part at ideal points, regions in which no tangible component of the apparatus is situated. [...]
We will picture the mental apparatus as a compound instrument, to the components of which we will give the name of ‘agencies’, or (for the sake of greater clarity) ‘systems.’ It is to be anticipated, in the next place, that these systems may perhaps stand in a regular spatial relation to one another, in the same kind of way in which the various systems of lenses in a telescope are arranged behind one another. Strictly speaking there is no need for the hypothesis that the psychical systems are actually arranged in a spatial order. It would be sufficient if a fixed order were established by the fact that in a given psychical process the excitation passes through the systems in a particular temporal sequence. [...] For the sake of brevity we will in future speak of the components of the apparatus as ‘Psi-systems.’
The first thing that strikes us is that this apparatus, compounded of Psi -systems, has a sense or direction. All our psychical activity starts from stimuli (whether internal or external) and ends in innervations. Accordingly, we shall ascribe a sensory and a motor end to the apparatus. At the sensory end there lies a system which receives perceptions; at the motor end there lies another, which opens the gateway to motor activity. Psychical processes advance in general from the perceptual end to the motor end. Thus the most general schematic picture of the psychical apparatus may be represented thus (Fig. 1) [Freud 1953-1974 (1900): 969-970]
In Freud's conception, an "apparatus"
is an abstract construction made by the analyzer, aiming to explain mental functioning (epistemological consistence close to Foucault's conception) .
is intended (a) as a virtual space containing / composed by a series of agencies or Psy - systems, standing in a regular spatial reciprocal position and (b) hosting and managing the passage of a flow of energy / excitation, which implies the shift from a spatial to a temporal ordering.
Freud's Legacy (1900)
The interpretation of dreams
To sum up...
Phenomenological film studies critics against the disembodied and passive nature of the subject [Sobchack 1992]
Philosophy, anthropology and sociology focusing the relationship between subjects and technological objects [ex. Simondon 1980 (1958), Latour 2005]
New film history approach: cinematic dispositive as part of a broader field of technological [Crary, Kittler] and / or entertainment - spectacle [Gaudreault, Gunning] apparatuses historically defined, and as integral to a wider redefinition of modern experience [Benjamin's legacy in Freedberg, Hansen, Casetti, etc.]
The post cinema / post media condition: cinema as "remediated" [Bolter & Grusin] by digital media and "relocated" [Casetti] in different spaces (home cinema, mobile vision, city screens, etc.)
Recent conditions for a rethinking of cinematic apparatus
The notion of dispositive [...] includes everything that is laid out in front of the spectator, together with all the elements that allow the representation to be viewed and heard. The dispositive involves both the making and the showing. The term is used when one or other of these aspects is addressed, on condition that it is considered as a network of relations between a spectator, the representation and the 'machinery' that allows the spectator to have access to the representation [Albera & Tortajada 2010: 10].
It is important to stress that dispositives have both a concrete existence — a cinema auditorium actually exists — and a discursive existence. For example, a particular phonographic practice may only be found in discourse, e.g., in literary discourse. Moreover, our long-term aim is not to describe the dispositives themselves, but the network of notions, theories, beliefs and practices that are woven into the discourses directly related to the elements of the dispositives, which are themselves put in relation within these discourses. By approaching dispositives from the angle of discourses, we are aiming to construct the conditions of possibility of the dispositives themselves as constituted knowledge. 
Our hypothesis is therefore that the new conditions of viewing and listening that emerged out of industrial society have redrawn the spectator-spectacle schema by introducing the question of the dispositive, which assigns a new position to those who view. This can be seen not only in the introduction of machines and tools that increase vision (from the telescope to the magic lantern), and recording or capturing devices (photography, the gramophone), but also in the promotion-spectacle of the manufactured object, its exhibition […] traffic conditions (speed) and urban relations (shocks), as well as in the commentaries that highlight such phenomena 
The epistemic schema brings together two distinct levels in its definition: the specification of the concrete elements of the various dispositives, and the concepts that are linked to them — for example, the notions of the breaking down of movement, temporal immediacy or deferred broadcasting.
We believe that in order to construct such a schema, it is vital to bring together several approaches, which we can summarise as follows: a) the study of discourses, b) the study of concrete dispositives, even if this is too simplistic a formalisation, as in both cases discourses may allow knowledge (savoir) to be constructed, and c) the study of institutional and social practices that are both engaged by, and that engage, these dispositives. The first two will be developed further (30-31)
Albera & Tortajada: epistemic schemata,
dispositives, social practices
To sum up
A&T conception correctly separates dispositives as "epistemic / discursive schemata" and dispositive as "real" connections between subjects and spectacular devices, but doesn't explain the way they are connected
[…] We can look at digital multimedia through the lens of early cinema and judge early cinema from a media-archaeological perspective, rather than a chronological or a genealogical one. One can even go a step further, and displace the cinematic apparatus (as we know it from the theories of Christian Metz, Jean Louis Baudry or Stephen Heath) by adding to it its four practices or perversions, depending on one's point of view. These are, to list them briefly, the scientific and medical cinematic apparatus (on which there are some excellent books, notably by Lisa Cartwright (1995)); the surveillance and military apparatus (theorized by, among others, Paul Virilio (1989) and Friedrich Kittler (1999)); the sensory-motor-schema apparatus (of Gilles Deleuze's (1986; 1989) philosophy); and the sensoring and monitoring apparatus (celebrated by Kevin Kelly (1999)), which speaks of feedback loops, pull technologies, searchability and augmented reality.[Elsaesser 2008: 232]
Yet the cinema borrowed from all these genres and practices, adapting them and significantly transforming their cultural meaning. In the process, both the mode of presentation and the audiences had to be 'disciplined' - 'disciplined through pleasure' one might call it - in order to become suitable for collective, public reception 
What this suggests is that the different ways in which the moving image in its multi-medial electronic form is today 'breaking the frame' and exceeding, if not altogether exiting, the movie theatre (giant display screens in airport lounges or railway stations, monitors in all walks of life, from gallery spaces to museum video art, from installation pieces to football stadiums, from tiny mobile screens to IMAX theatres), we may be 'returning' to early cinema practice, remembering Lumière's giant screen for the 1900 Paris World Exhibition, PathS's Baby projector for living room use, or W.K. Dickson's experiments with 68mm film stock to capture the grandeur of Niagara Falls. [235-236]
Elsaesser reads contemporary digital dispositives from the point of view of the early cinema, and vice versa
As a consequence, he's direcly interested in relationships between (hystorical defined, and not only spectacular) dispositives, not in those between dispositives and systems of knowledge
To sum up
Elsaesser:The difference of apparatuses
in the past and in the present
[Both the "degraded vision" of movies by digital devices and their display in museum, exhibitions and artists installation, can't be properly considered "cinema". Indeed,] the living projection of a film in a movie theater, in the dark, for the prescribed time of a more or less collective session, became and remains the condition for a unique experience of perception and memory, defining its spectator [...] And just this one is worth to be called "cinema" [Bellour 2012: 14].
We should fully assume this apparent contradiction: the dispositive of cinema is historical, it is also trans historical. Variable, it must be thought in its identity. In this sense, the Lumière event remains absolute. 
[a particular form of] emotion, questionable or not, defines the film, and [...] below or above this, we should seek other words to specify the effect of moving images that are displayed in an indeterminate space and time 
Bellour outlines the specificity of "traditional" film viewing as a historical and trans-historical form of cognitive and emotional experience, strictly linked to cinema dispositive (the movie theater, the darkness, the crowd, the prescribed time, etc.)
Bellour: cinema dispositive and film experience
To sum up
The french term "dispositif" refers to
two different and connected concepts
A network of discourses, pieces of knowledge, values, etc. reciprocally linked and governed / defined by strategies of management of power: an "
A set of subjects, objects, physical spaces reciprocally linked and governed / defined by both a spatial disposition and the course of a series of defined events: a "
Both apparatuses and dispositives
hypothetical configuration produced by the analyst in order to explain documented phenomena
historically and culturally located entities
From the one hand, they are provided with an intrinsecally dynamical nature, on the other one they tend to state of "omeodynamic" equilibrium and relative stability
relation between an apparatus and one or many dispositives
is such that
apparatus produces dispositives
dispositives turn apparatus into concrete, experiential form: dispositives are the experiential side of apparatus
the living and lived experiences made through dispositives realize, "reproduces" and trasform apparatus.
relations between dispositives
are such that
any dispositive can translate, remediate, metaphorize, incorporate, each of the other.
Through these operations, each dispositive re-define itself and the other.
"Dominant" dispositives are able to (a) translate the widest part of the apparatus in experiential terms (b) reabsorb (both in phisical and in metaphorical terms) most of the other contemporary dispositives; (c) self - represent and self - define itself in most clear terms, then contributing to self assign a relatively steady "homeodynamic" state .
: (1) a
one, expressed by a set of subjects, objects and their arrangement; (2) an energetic/dynamical one expressed by a series of
Can imply a representational device; in this case dispositives acquire a strong tool of domination, since this device can be used to
self-represent the dispositive itself
or other "remediated" dispositives (see above)
I'll call "
" dispositives in which topical and narrative components are mainly involved in processes of circulation of perceptions
onclusions and statements
Around the Twenties cinema dispositive re-absorb in metaphorical terms the hypnotical dispositive.
By this way, on the one hand, a series of elements of hypnotical "scene" are re-used to make sense of the situation of film viewing. As a consequence, hypnotism contributes to a clear self definition of cinema dispositive and therefore to its domination
At the same time, on the other hand, cinema dispositive contribute to redefine the hypnotical scene and, particularly, to "reassemble" the components of the new, modern hypnotic scene that were previously scattered
Since centered on a representation device, cinema dispositive kept representing itself trough representation of hypnotic scene: a series of film are self-theoretical, that is they express through the metaphor of hypnotism a theory of cinema dispositive.
Cinema & Hipnotism