Bredo's Response to Howe

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by Micah Miner0 views·Updated Jun 19, 2014
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  1. Kenneth R. Howe challenges the currently dominant conception of education research, arguing that it is based on an obsolete, positivistic conception of science.
  2. He also suggests that three of the most salient divisions within the education research community are products of the same obsolete misunderstanding.
  3. Strong divisions between approaches to research—quantitative versus qualitative, descriptive versus normative, scientific versus humanistic—are primarily the result of positivistic dogma, he suggests.
  4. This perspective leads him to consider several recent formulations of research standards is based on similar obsolete premises, including those of he U.S. Department of Education’s Institute of Education Sciences (IES) and the broader standards adopted by the National Research Council (NRC) and the American Educational Research ssociation (AERA).
  5. Howe recommends a more rhetorical conception of science, a widened definition of legitimate education research that includes approaches modeled equally on the humanities and the sciences, and greater inclusion of diverse voices in the education research process.
  6. 1. Three Dogmas of Reductionism
  7. The Quantitative–Qualitative Hierarchy
  8. The Fact–Value Hierarchy
  9. The Science–Humanities Hierarchy

Transcript

Getting Over the Methodology Wars:

Comments on Howe

Howe’s (2009) critique of positivistic tendencies in the education research community is valuable and pertinent. His analysis is nonetheless one-sided, finding fault with one side of current divisions alone. In an effort to retain the good points of his analysis, the author first summarizes Howe’s argument, interpreting it as a critique of hasty and dogmatic reductionism. He then considers parallel problems arising from hasty and dogmatic holism that Howe does not address. Following this discussion, a third, temporal approach is suggested in which analytic

and synthetic perspectives are used to suggest and modify one another in a cycle, rather than being taken as fixed stances. Adopting this approach could help reduce the dogmatism evident in the methodology wars, although struggles for advantage would clearly remain.

Bredo's Critique

Howe’s critique is especially pertinent at a time when a narrow

emphasis on instrumental efficiency, a mechanistic conception of“what works,” and a narrow conception of science dominate education discourse. I think he is right that a new orthodoxy is afoot in some sectors of the education research community that is narrow, dogmatic, and harmful to freedom of thought. Howe’s analysis is also helpful in revealing similarities among debates polarizing the research community, debates whose relation to one another is seldom seen so clearly. In assisting us in thinking deeply about the values and assumptions underlying current conceptions of education research, he does exactly what a good philosopher of education should do.

Although sympathetic with much that Howe has written, I nevertheless fear that he has gone a bit overboard in attempting to bring about greater balance. Howe is critical only of a positivistic

approach to education research, making it seem as though all fault lies on that side on the polarities he analyzes. His interpretation is understandable given the politics of the time, but reaction

and counterreaction reinforce one another, resulting in mutually confirming cycles of divisiveness (Bateson, 1962).

Conclusions

First, and simplest, it would be better if those of analytic and synthetic temperament learned from one another rather than engaging in methodology wars.

Second, there is only one proper standard for education research: It should perform its function well. A good research project is one that clears up ambiguities in the situation it aims to resolve while opening up fruitful lines of future inquiry.

Third, statements of research standards should take account of C. S. Peirce’s (1898/1998) first rule of logic: “Do not block the way of inquiry” (p. 48). This is basically the same as the statement in the Hippocratic oath that one should, above all, do no harm. Standards are hints for how to do things well, not rules to follow slavishly. Standardization of thought will only impoverish, not improve, education research.

Fourth, although Howe’s article is extremely helpful in its criticism of the contemporary reincarnation of positivism, it is somewhat one-sided. I have tried to suggest a way of achieving greater balance by adopting a temporal approach in which different perspectives are used cyclically to guide and constrain one another.

Fifth, although there is much to recommend Phillips’s advocacy

of a postpositivistic middle ground, a more dynamic conception

of balance would consider how various perspectives can be used to achieve a common purpose by taking one another into

account rather than by adopting a midpoint between them.

Bredo's Response to Howe

The Value–Fact Hierarchy

  • A holistic orientation also tends to reverse the fact–value hierarchy. Considered holistically, facts are inclusions of inquiries having an overall orientation or aim. The very fact that a given educational issue is considered a “problem,” for example, is likely to make the behavior of some person or group problematic and the behavior of others unproblematic, thereby raising questions about who really has the problem. Educational concepts such cognitive development or moral development, which tend to be based on the values and experiences of one group, implicitly privilege that group over others, confusing its norms with universal standards (Cole, 1996; Gilligan, 1982). For these and other reasons, value orientations can be viewed as constituting the “facts” themselves rather than being separable from them.

The Qualitative–Quantitative Hierarchy

  • Those favoring qualitative research sometimes attempt to turn the tables on quantitative researchers by proclaiming qualitative research ore basic or foundational than quantitative. This assertion is based on the notion that for any event to count as the “same” as another, norms and interpretive practices must be used to discriminate it from other events.

BREDO's

"Reductionism becomes hasty and dogmatic when it is presupposed that wholes—theories, ideas, plans, actions, and so forth—can be reduced to independently testable or implementable parts and the latter treated as given and secure foundations. Holism becomes hasty and dogmatic when it is presupposed that no reduction is possible without total loss of meaning, and security found only in wholes, which are also treated as given foundations. In other words, each orientation becomes rigid and dogmatic when it is believed to be the only true approach.

Seen in this way, each of the one-sided orientations dividing the education research community has something useful to contribute, especially when not adopted in a fixed or dogmatic fashion. Qualitative generalization within a case can assist quantitative generalization across cases, and vice-versa. In fact, neither makes much sense without the other. Judgments about fact and value may also be used to modify one another: Reflection on present aims or values helps in judging whether one is considering the correct facts, and inquiry into factual consequences helps in judging whether a given aim or value is truly valuable (Dewey, 1939). Scientific exploration of means and humanistic exploration of ends can and should inform one another in a society seeking to be both technically progressive and humane. Having a feel for the whole combined with technical accuracy of parts, each informing the other to achieve

something in common, is what is needed in any art, including that of social and education research (Dewey, 1934).

SUMMARY

1
  • Kenneth R. Howe challenges the currently dominant conception of education research, arguing that it is based on an obsolete, positivistic conception of science.
2
  • He also suggests that three of the most salient divisions within the education research community are products of the same obsolete misunderstanding.
3
  • Strong divisions between approaches to research—quantitative versus qualitative, descriptive versus normative, scientific versus humanistic—are primarily the result of positivistic dogma, he suggests.
4
  • This perspective leads him to consider several recent formulations of research standards is based on similar obsolete premises, including those of he U.S. Department of Education’s Institute of Education Sciences (IES) and the broader standards adopted by the National Research Council (NRC) and the American Educational Research ssociation (AERA).
5
  • Howe recommends a more rhetorical conception of science, a widened definition of legitimate education research that includes approaches modeled equally on the humanities and the sciences, and greater inclusion of diverse voices in the education research process.
6

1. Three Dogmas of Reductionism

  • Howe’s central thesis is that the most troubling divisions in the education research community result from beliefs associated with logical positivism.
  • To support this thesis he argues that each of three dogmas associated with a polarized split within the education research community is consistent with beliefs associated with logical positivism.
7

The Quantitative–Qualitative Hierarchy

  • The first dogma is the notion that quantitative research is the truly scientific form of education research that can (and should) be purified by separating it from qualitative research. Qualitative research is then viewed as a merely exploratory or imaginative phase of inquiry that is unscientific but can be replaced by a later quantitative phase in which claims are scientifically “verified” rather than merely “discovered.”
8

The Fact–Value Hierarchy

  • The second “dogma” is the notion that science is about matters of fact alone, and that it can and should be purified by separating it from wider, nonepistemic values. One sees this attitude in everyday life in the United States, where fact and value are believed to be quite different things, values being impossible to criticize objectively. One sees it also in education research where scientific research is thought to be about means, or “what works,” whereas normative or critical inquiry is viewed as primarily about ends, such as social justice.
9

The Science–Humanities Hierarchy

  • The third “dogma” that Howe criticizes is the notion that the sciences are the true contributors to knowledge, whereas the humanities serve a merely expressive function. This belief also serves to polarize the education research community, privileging the scientific over the humanistic, the modern over the postmodern. The fairly obvious gender implications of the contrast, as educational Researcher traditionally conceived, also tend to lead to feminist criticism of this notion.