Peace Science

photo credit Nasa / Goddard Space Flight Center / Reto Stöckli William Reed University of Maryland wlr@umd.edu The Rebels' Credibility Problem Commitment Problems & Civil War Termination Asymmetric Power & Commitment Problems The Government's Commitment Problem The Rebels' Commitment Problem A Model of the Rebels' Credibility Problem Rebels Bargain with the Government The Rebels are uncertain about the Government's fighting capacity How the Government responds to the Rebels' demands provide information about the consequences of fighting Weak Rebels have a credibility problem. The Rebels' search for credibility shapes their bargaining with the Government Analyzing the Model When the rebels are strong, there is an interior solution to the model. When the rebels are weak, there is a corner solution to the model. Comparative Statics when there is a corner solution. What makes a Rebels' commitment problem (corner solution) more likely? Empirical Implications Relative fighting capacity has a non-monotonic effect on civil war termination. Data description Summary of Econometric Model The Rebels' Search for Credibility Mobilization - making the threat to fight credible. Lowering Costs - making the threat to fight credible. Political Mobilization - raising the costs of backing down to the government. The role of third parties. Conclusions Context matters Relative effect of government vs. rebels' commitment problems. Further empirical Implicaitions and Tests